We study the interactions among Internet providers in vehicular networks which offer access to commuters via road side units (RSUs). Namely, we propose a game-theoretical framework to model the competition on prices between vehicular Internet providers to capture the largest amount of users, thus selfishly maximizing the revenues. The equilibria of the aforementioned game are characterized under different mobile traffic conditions, RSU capabilities and users requirements and expectations. In particular, we also consider in the analysis the case where mobile users modify the price they accept to pay for the access as the likeliness of finding an access solution decreases.
Introduction
The applications enabled by VANETs are not only limited to 8 safety-oriented ones, but also extend to leisure applications 9 related to Internet access and entertainment along the road. 10 A comprehensive classification of VANETs applications can 11 be found in [12] . 12 The design of VANET architectures to support leisure ap-13 plications has attracted the attention of recent work and re-14 searchers; as an example, the Drive-thru Internet [22] project 15 targets the provision of affordable Internet connections to 16 vehicular users through road side Wireless LAN infrastruc-17 ture. The scope of the research covers network access, roam-18 ing, handover, authentication, etc., and the achieved results 19 show that despite a number of technical challenges to be ad-20 dressed, providing Internet for highly mobile vehicular users 21 is possible [21] [22] [23] 25] . The CABERNET [7] and Infostations 22 [28] projects propose architectures similar to Drive-Thru In- 23 ternet. Motivated by these works, we expect that the provi- 24 sion of Internet connectivity via road side infrastructure will 25 be a flourishing market in the next future attracting Internet 26 providers which may possibly compete among themselves. 27 This competition may have a valuable impact on customers 28 welfare, as well as influence the quality and cost of all afore- 29 mentioned features about road safety.
The scientific literature already counts a number of stud- 31 ies of competition between classical Internet access providers 32 (see, e.g., [1, 15] or [16, Chapter 5]). In many cases, the in- 33 teractions among users (through congestion) are also con- 34 sidered, and taken into account by access providers [9, 10] . 35 However, to the best of our knowledge the case of provider 36 competition in vehicular networks has not been deeply in- protocol for V2V communications. 88 The suitability of WLAN hotspots for providing Internet 89 access in vehicular scenario is studied in [7, 22, 28] . In [22] , 90 mobile users exploit temporary WLAN connections during 91 their road trip to download/upload contents form/to the In-92 ternet; the main challenge addressed in this work is to main-93 tain a seamless connectivity even if the physical connec-94 tion with a road side access point may get lost temporarily. 95 Along the same lines, automatic access point association/de-96 association procedures are studied in [24, 26] in the very 97 same vehicular network architecture. Besides a purely theo-98 retical studies, special equipments for highly mobile scenar-99 ios are in development, among which a router with 3G and 100 WLAN interfaces is designed to ensure seamless handovers, 101 proposed by NEC Corporation in 2005. In [25] , the authors 102 discuss the requirements for such a router and test their own 103 prototype of modular access gateway.
104
Another research area related to this work deals with the 105 optimal design of vehicular networks, where the problem 106 mainly scales down to efficiently deploying RSU to maxi-107 mize the "quality" perceived by the mobile user in terms of 108 download/upload throughput, and/or latency to retrieve con-109 tents form the Internet through the deployed RSUs. Trullols 110 et al. [30] [29] . 133 In this paper, unlike in the previously described refer-134 ences we ignore V2V communications and focus only on 135 users which aim to establish Internet connection. In that con-136 text, we consider price competition between Internet access 137 providers in the case of vehicular networks, which is, to the 138 best of our knowledge, a novel issue. The scientific literature 139 contains several analyses of provider competition in general 140 wireless networks (e.g., [6, 17, 31] ), but, even if V2I networks 141 bear some similarities with generic wireless access networks, 142 they have specific features which make the pricing prob-143 lem worth analyzing. Indeed, in generic wireless access net-144 works, the network operator competition is generally over 145 the "common" users, that is, those users which fall in the 146 coverage area of the competing network providers. In other 147 words, competition between providers arise only if the cover-148 age areas of the networks (partially) overlap as in [ 235 it to be non-increasing: each user can be seen as having a 236 maximum price below which he/she accepts the service, and 237 above which he/she refuses to connect, the function w( · ) 238 then represents the complementary cumulative distribution 239 function of those acceptance prices among users. The total flow λ j from users seeing first Provider j consists of: 243 1. users accepting the price p j and being served by 244 Provider j; heading to the competitor's RSU).
250
The two latter flows then enter the coverage area of the 251 competing provider, where they can be served or not. 252 We consider here that users may change their price ac-253 ceptance threshold after meeting one provider and having 254 either refused its price or been rejected due to capacity lim-255 its.
In the following, we analyze both cases in which re-256 fused/rejected users increase and decrease their willingness 257 to pay as they go by. It is worth noting that these behaviors 258 are well representative of realistic situations:
259
• willingness-to-pay increases, if the user's request was re- 260 jected due to congestion, this signal of resource scarcity 261 may increase the user's willingness-to-pay; alternatively, 262 users may know that there are several RSUs on the high-263 way they are using, and hence may "take a bet" for the 264 first RSU they meet, by being more demanding than they 265 (demand from users refusing to pay p j ). All users unserved after passing Provider j increase their willingness-to-pay. We define the same flows, indexed by k, for users traveling in the opposite direction. willingness-to-pay when changing provider, not RSUs.
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In this paper, we consider a simple multiplicative change 285 of the acceptance threshold:
286
• if a user refused to pay the price of the first RSU he/she 287 met, his price acceptance threshold is multiplied by α;
288
• if a user accepted the price of an RSU but his request was 289 rejected due to congestion, his price acceptance threshold 290 is multiplied by β.
291
To simplify a bit the analysis, we assume in the follow-292
ing that α = β, i.e., users that are not served modify their Q3 293 acceptance threshold price by the same factor, whether they 294 had accepted or refused the price of the first RSU they met. 295 Such an assumption is realistic, if the price variation is inter-296 preted as a response to the decreasing likelihood of finding 297 another (cheap) RSU.
298
It is worth pointing out that if all users simultaneously 299 accept to pay a price α times larger (smaller) than before, 300 then the proportion of users accepting to pay p is changed 301 from w(p) to w( p α ). Fig. 2 shows an example of how the 302 willingness-to-pay function changes after users have passed 303 RSU 2, when no congestion occurs at RSU 2. Some of the 304 users seeing Provider 2 first (a proportion w(p 2 ) of them) ac-305 cepted to pay the price of Provider 2 and were served, and 306 thus do not need a connection anymore. The others increase 307 the maximum price they can afford by α: the proportion of 308 users seeing Provider 2 first and accepting to pay price p 1 is 309
310
We now decompose formally the components of the user 311 flows reaching Provider j and accepting to pay his price p j : 312 1. those seeing Provider j first, thus issuing a total de-313 mand (since they accept to pay p j )
2. those seeing Provider k = j (the competing provider) 315 first, who refused to pay p k but would accept the price 316 
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328 λ T j (p j , p k ) := w(p j )λ j + λ k [w(p j /α) − w(p k )] + + min 1, w(p j /α) w(p k ) λ sp k
Rejected users and uniqueness of flows

329
When the total demand at an RSU exceeds its capacity, 
336
Again, the probability P j depends on the price vector (p i , p k ).
337
The corresponding revenue of provider j is then
The traffic λ sp j , that is the part of λ j spilled over by 339 Provider j (and that will then enter the competitor's coverage 340 area) also depends on both prices through the probability P j , 341 and equals
Regrouping all components of λ T j , the success probability 343 equals 344 
We obtain similar equations when p 1 < p 2 /α and
by switching the roles of Providers 1 and 2. Further, if p 2 /α ≤ 348
Finally, if p 2 /α ≥ p 1 ≥ p 2 α (which can be the case for 350 
ways exists. In addition we have p c
Solving this system then yields the capacity saturation 377 
the RSU capacity of provider j is saturated, and thus users having refused the price of provider j:
, then the capacity of provider k is sat-397 urated and 
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, then the capacity of provider k is saturated 404 and he gains 
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate both cases, with the only remark 408 that in Fig. 4 
, then the capacity of provider k is saturated 422 and his revenue is payoff by unilaterally changing his price. The underlying as-442 sumption is that each provider knows in real time the current 443 price of its competitor and is able to instantly adapt to it; but 444 even if it is not the case, the providers can use the Nash equi-445 librium outcome as a prediction of their perfect information 446 competition, and simultaneously charge equilibrium prices. 447 Further, we investigate the situation where providers would 448 decide to cooperate, trying to maximize the sum of their in-449 dividual revenues (as a monopolist would do). We analyze 450 how much the providers may lose in terms of total revenue 451 by refusing to cooperate. 452 We first formally define the pricing game. where N = {1, 2} is the set of players (the two providers), P = 455 (P 1 , P 2 ) = (0, p max ] 2 is the space of players strategies and R = 456 (R 1 , R 2 ) is players payoffs or revenues given in (2). 457 We are interested in finding the Nash equilibrium of that 458 pricing game. 
Nash equilibria can be interpreted as predictions for the 462 outcome of the competition between selfish entities, as-463 sumed rational and taking decisions simultaneously. For sim-464 plicity in this section we use the linear willingness-to-pay 465 function, however the analogical results can be obtained for 466 any other convex non-increasing function numerically. 
Large capacities regime
468
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that RSU ca-469 pacities exceed the total user flow (i.e., c ≥ λ j + λ k ). In par-470 ticular, for any price profile RSU capacities are not saturated, 471 and there is no spillover traffic. 
• a symmetric Nash equilibrium, of the form (BR
leading to
• an asymmetric Nash equilibrium, with one provider (say, 528 Provider j) playing BR 
Considering again the homogeneous flow case, we deter-531 mine the conditions on α for those price profiles to be Nash 532 equilibria. 2. For the symmetric equilibrium described in (9), the con- 538 dition of existence is:
which is equivalent to α ≤ 0.8.
540
Please cite this article as: V. 3. For the asymmetric equilibrium described in (10), the 541 conditions of existence are:
The first condition is equivalent to α ≥ 0. there may be no Nash equilibrium.
580
The price decrease of the provider who had originally (for 581 α = 1) the lowest price can be explained as follows: when 582 the opponent decreases his price (that is lower at the sym-583 metric equilibrium than at the original one) the refused flow 584 reduces, and the influence of α is only on users from that 585 flow who later accept to pay the proposed price. Thus, the 586 provider is interested in lowering the price to attract more of 587 those users. range of values for α, this leads each provider to set a 614 price below its competitor's until a point where focus-615 ing on one's flow-by setting large prices-is better, so that 616 best-response curves do not intersect. Predicting the prices 617 that are then chosen is difficult, since for any profile of 618 prices at least one provider could do better by changing his 619 price.
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For a linear willingness-to-pay function, taking the 634 partial derivatives yields
leading to the optimal price values
for α ≤ 0.5 + 11/12. The corresponding total rev-637 enue is then
, the total revenue is:
Again, partial derivatives give:
and the optimal prices are
yielding a total revenue
α , the total revenue is:
Again, partial derivatives give: 
Fig. 7 plots the individual revenues of both providers in 652 the competition and cooperation cases assuming an equal 653 share of cooperative revenue among providers for the lat-654 ter, a reasonable assumption under homogeneous conditions 655 (symmetric traffic flows, equal capacity, same willingness-656 to-pay function for users traveling in both directions). It ap-657 pears that cooperation would improve the revenue of both 658 providers, even the one that had the most favorable position 659 in the asymmetric equilibrium. 
The impact on user surplus
661
In this section we consider the equilibria of the pricing 662 game from the point of view of users. Note that our model 663 does not define a measure for individual customer efficiency: 664 each customer is either fully served-getting a utility equal to 665 his willingness-to-pay-or not served at all-getting zero util-666 ity; in case of congestion at an RSU, the unserved users are 667 chosen uniformly among those accepting the proposed price. 668 Thus, instead of efficiency we use user surplus, that is the dif- 669 ference between what users wanted to pay and what they ac-670 tually payed. We focus here on the large capacity case. Recall 671 that user willingness-to-pay varies in our scenario: we con-672 sider the initial willingness-to-pay as the reference: when 673 α > 1, users served by the second provider met may actu-674 ally pay more than they originally wanted to pay; in this case 675 their surplus will be considered negative. 676 If we consider just one flow direction λ j and denote by 677 p j the price of the first provider this flow meets, and by p k 678 the price of the second one, then the positive part of users 679 surplus is as follows: which includes surplus from users served by j, and by k. The 681 negative part of users surplus is: is large in the large-capacity case, but we cannot say anything 709 about its quality.
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710
In this section, we carry out a numerical analysis for 711 some willingness-to-pay function examples, not restricting 712 ourselves to linear ones. We are in particular interested in 713 finding a minimum willingness-to-pay variation valueᾱ for 714 which a symmetric equilibrium appears, and compare the 715 prices in this equilibrium with those for the case α = 1. Table 2 shows provider prices at equilibrium, when there 722 is no variation (α = 1) and when the variation leads to a 723 symmetric equilibrium. For the willingness-to-pay functions 724 considered, which follow our convexity and monotonicity as- 725 sumptions, we still observe a price decrease after some α, 726 illustrating that this phenomenon does not only occur with 727 linear w functions. 728 We also consider in Appendix C the case where users 729 moving in different directions modify their willingness-to-730 pay differently (i.e., one value of α for each direction). This 731 scenario can correspond to situation when the highway 732 stretch under consideration is close to a city area; users head-733 ing toward the city can anticipate to have several other con-734 nection opportunities (hence a low α), while those leaving 735 the city face a higher risk of not finding other (cheap) ways 736 to connect (hence a higher α). 
where the last inequality comes from the nonincreasingness 878 of w( · ).
Assuming that provider j is not saturated and then P j = 1 881 we can differentiate in p j :
where w is the derivative of w, and the last inequality 883 comes from the fact that w ( · ) ≤ 0.
Assuming that provider j is not saturated and then P j = 886 1:
• If p k > p j α and p k > p j /α, we show that the success prob- 
We then remark that, all else being equal, g(x) is non-893 decreasing in p j , so the solution P k of the fixed-point equation 894 g(x) = x is also non-decreasing in p j .
895
As a result, when p k ≥ p j /α the component Appendix C. Heterogeneous willingness-to-pay variations 899 In this section we assume that user pricing preferences 900 change differently for both flow directions. Some users may 901 for example move toward a city and thus expect to meet 902 more APs, while the users moving in the opposite direction 903 are risking not to meet any APs in the nearest future. The for-904 mer may not increase much their willingness-to-pay, while 905 the latter have higher risks to fail to establish Internet con-906 nection, and thus are more flexible in price perception. 907 Let us consider that the α values are different for two 908 flows and that without loss of generality α 1 value for users 909 seeing Provider 1 first is bigger than for those, seeing first 910 Provider 2, i.e., α 1 = hα 2 = hα, for some h ≥ 1. 
